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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
TUPPER AND THE QUEEN
J. C. E. WOOD *-
Almost every aspect of human life in the Twentieth Century is
characterized by dramatic change. Firmly believing in the idea of
progress, society generally welcomes each new development as a step
on the road to a better life. Legal theory on the other hand, is charac-
terized by its constancy. The legal profession clings with tenacity to
outmoded concepts and hoary patterns of thought. With the prolifera-
tion of statutes resulting from the ever increasing activity of modern
government, the problems of judicial interpretation of statutory
language become more acute every year. The traditional approach to
this task is clearly inadequate. The solutions it provides have been
weighed in the balance of utility and found lacking. Judicial process
must be reformed and new methods adopted by the judiciary if law
is to fill the needs of modern society.
THE CANADIAN HERITAGE
The dominant legal philosophy of the Canadian judiciary is
English positivism,' which involves the assertion that law is the
command of a sovereign authority, found in the acts of a legislature,
or past court decisions. It is an entity which exists and can be
known. From this it follows that the words of a statute contain a
"meaning" which, when found, expresses the sovereign will of the
legislature. The positivist approach to the problem of interpretation,
therefore, proceeds from the premise that it is the function of a
judge to find the "intent" of the legislature, and to give effect to it.
In theory this can be achieved in most cases by examining the lan-
guage of the statute, and attributing to it a "literal" or "plain"
meaning. As an aid to discovery the courts use the ordinary gram-
matical rules of construction. The "ejusdem generis" rule, for example,
states that a general phrase is restricted to instances of the same type
as preceding specific words. The rule "expressio unius exclusio alter-
ius" indicates that the expression of one thing in a statute excludes
by implication other things unexpressed. If it applies these rules and
construes words in their ordinary or customary sense, the court will
usually find that a statute has a clear meaning, and ".... if the precise
words used are plain and unambiguous... [it is] ... bound to con-
strue them in their ordinary sense even though it leads to an absurd-
ity or a manifest injustice". 2 Occasionally the language of the statute
* Jt. C. E. Wood, LL.B. Osgoode, is a member of the 1968 graduating
class. This paper received the 1968 Reading Law Club prize in Jurisprudence
at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 McWhinney, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in Canada (1959), in
M. MACGUIGAN, JURISPRUDENCE: READINcS AND CASES (Toronto, 1966) at 652.
2 Abley v. Dale, 11 C.B. 391; quoted in Willis, Statute Interpretation in a
Nutshell (1938), 16 CAN. B. REV. 1, at 10.
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in question may be too ambiguous to admit of a "plain" meaning.
Then the search for intention may include an examination of the
preamble or title of the Act, or other Acts in pari materia with the
one being considered. If intent still proves elusive, the various canons
and presumptions pronounced by judges over the years will be used
to arrive at the true meaning of the Act.
This is the basis of the technique which follows from acceptance
of the positivist position.3 It purports to reduce to a minimum the
law making function of the judge, and to give a maximum of respon-
sibility to the legislature. Those who adhere to this position claim
that the emphasis on the plain meaning rule gives certainty and
predictability to the law. It forces the courts to remain subordinate
to the will of the legislature, the only position compatible with
democratic theory. Like Lord Evershed, they fondly hope that
"... out of the vast body of judicial decisions on the interpretation of
statutes, there will in the end emerge rules, few in number but well
understood, generally applicable or applicable to particular and defined
classes of legislation, which may supersede and render obsolete other
dicta derived from a different age and a different philosophy."4
THE ANTITHESIS
It is against this principle of interpretation that the American
legal realists directed their devastating attack. Men like Max Radins
denied that a statute could ever have an inherent meaning which
would clearly apply to any situation, until the courts have interpreted
it. Every statute (excepting possibly the bill of attainder) is a state-
ment in more or less general terms, which concerns a range of
situations. As such it is almost by definition ambiguous. The events
to which it will be applied are unique, in time if nothing else. When
a court states that the meaning of a statute is plain it has already
interpreted the words in question, and has decided that the event
before it must be included within, or excluded from, the class to
which those words refer. Does a statute which provides that theft
of a cow shall be grand larceny apply where a heifer is stolen?
The meaning is plain, but only after a heifer has been classified as
a cow. 6 Plain meaning at law exists only as a matter of legal fiat.7
Not only do the realists assert that the notion of meaning is
fictional, but they deny that there is anything in reality which can
be identified as legislative intention. A legislature is comprised of
many members each of whom may have had his own idea of what
3 The various interpretation acts (e.g., Interpretation Act, S.C. 1967, c. 7)
affect the various techniques only minimally, and will not be considered inthis Taper.th Introduction to WILsoN & GALPIN, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATIONq OF
STATUTES (11th edition, 1962).
5 Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930), 43 HARv. L. REv. 863.
6 People v. Soto, 49 O.L. 67 (1874) quoted in H. HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw
(1958), at 1279.
7 Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Mean-
ing: "The Middle Road" (1962), 40 TEXAs L. REV. 751 at 762.
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was involved in an act when he voted. Even if every individual voter
were of the same mind, there would be no way to know that intention.
If the intention discerned is that of the draftsman of the bill, then
it is not legislative but ministerial. Ambiguities in a statute are often
the consequence of the necessity for group action to achieve legisla-
tion. "There is little meaning to a statute, consequently, because if
there had been more, there might have been insufficient agreement
to enact it.1'8 Finally, the concept of intention becomes patently spuri-
ous when conditions which prompted the passing of a statute change,
so that the remedy it provides is inappropriate. In this case, as with
other unforeseen situations, the legislature did not, and could not have
intended to provide a standard, because it had no faculty for pre-
science.
The critics of positivism have highlighted the futility of the use
of rules, presumptions and canons of construction to find this fictitious
legislative intent, by pointing out that almost every rule has an oppo-
site, and both can apply to any interpretive situation. Karl Llewellyn
has paired statements by American judges which illustrate this
characteristic of rules.9 The same could easily be done with English
or Canadian dicta. It is a presumption, for example,
"1... that the legislature does not intend to make any substantial altera-
tion in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, either in express terms
or by clear implication, ... 10
But it had also been stated that
"... even where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the
whole object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be
attributed to the words if they are fairly susceptible to it."11
It is reasonably obvious that when contradictory "rules" can be
applied to a given event the "rule" itself cannot be the basis of
decision.
Despite the verisimilitude provided by Latin phraseology, the
various maxims have no real content, say the rule sceptics, and add
neither predictability, nor certainty, to the law. When a court states
the ejusdem generis rule the real decision is not whether general
words are limited by those preceding, but whether the rule itself is
to be denied or affirmed in the particular case.12 To the realist, the
rules, maxims, presumptions and canons of construction are no more
than devices ". . . whereby to achieve some desired result." 13 The
judge remains free to choose which of innumerable rules he will use.
His choice must be based on factors independent of rules.
8 Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Mean-
ing: "The High Road" (1956), 35 TuxAs L. REv. 63 at 75.
9 Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the rules
or canons about How Statutes are to be Construed (1950), 3 Vw. L. Rv. 365.
10 WsoN & GALPiN, supra, note 4 at 78.
11 Id. at 66.
12 Radin, supra, note 5 at 874.
13 WILIs, supra, note 2 at 11.
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Even those staunch in defence of the literal rule cannot wholly
ignore the general purpose of the statute, what C. K. Allen calls the
ratio legis.14 Most judges will rebel against the rigid application of
unreasonable language. The difficulty lies in striking a balance be-
tween ".... two antagonistic principles-the authority of the printed
word and the dictates of legal reasonableness .".15 It is in this con-
flict between the literal rule and good sense, that the reasoning of
the traditional approach is reduced to absurdity.
Here the court may rely on the "Golden Rule":
"The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to,
unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or incon-
sistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical
and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid that
absurdity or inconsistency but no farther."16
There is, of course, no way of knowing what constitutes an absurdity
or an inconsistency, without which "[h] owever unjust, arbitrary or
inconvenient the meaning conveyed may be, it must receive its full
effect."1 The inadequacy of this method of reasoning is evident in
what appears to be a serious statement in the leading text: "The
difficulty lies in deciding between words that are plain but absurd
and words which are so absurd as not to be deemed plain."M8
PLAIN MEANING REVIVED
In spite of the apparent shortcomings of the traditional approach
to statutory interpretation, its theoretical justification has recently
been reformulated by H. L. A. Hart.19 Hart's philosophy of law is a
variety of legal positivism in which he substitutes the conception of
an ultimate rule of recognition, providing a basis for rules and
criteria of validity, for the Austinian habit of obedience to a legally
unlimited sovereign. 20 This rule of recognition is the source of law
from which primary and secondary rules making up the legal system
have developed. Primary rules impose duties, and compel men to do
or abstain from doing certain actions. Secondary rules confer powers,
public or private, and provide a method by which men can introduce
new primary rules, or vary, control or extinguish old ones.21 Because
Hart sees law as a body of rules proceeding from a formal source,
he must attribute some content to those rules. He states that the
language in which they are expressed can have meaning within limits.
All general words have a core of settled meaning, a range of standard
instances within which they can be applied with certainty.22 In addi-
14 C. ALLEN, LAW iN THE MAKING (1964), at 491.
Is Id. at 492.
16 Gray v. Pearson, 10 E.R. 1235; quoted in Willis, supra, note 2 at 12.
17 WILSoNT & GALPN, supra, note 4 at 5.
18 Id. at 7.
19 H. HART, CONCEPT oF LAW (1961).
20 Id. pp. 102-7.
21 Id. pp. 78-9.
22 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals (1958), 71
HARV. L. REv. 593 in MACGuiGAx, supra, note 1 at 200.
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tion to the "paradigm, clear cases", 23 however, there is a penumbra
of doubt surrounding legislative meaning, a class of "debatable cases
in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled
out".24 Here the open texture of language leaves discretion to the
judge to choose whether or not a penumbral situation is to be included
within the rule as being legally similar to a core situation. It is only
in this vague area of "uncertainty at the borderline" 25 that the judge
has a legislative function, a choice which should be made in the light
of social aims.26 With the great mass of ordinary cases meaning is
determinate and can be applied without difficulty. Where the unen-
visaged case does arise an aim or purpose must be attributed to the
rule and the question decided by confronting the issues at stake,
if... choosing between the competing interests in the way which best
satisfies us.",27
The primary difficulty with this theory of the nature of statutory
language is that it offers no criteria for determining whether any
given case falls within the core of standard instances, requiring mere
application of the rule, or whether it is a penumbral situation, requir-
ing judicial creativity and a consideration of social aims. This is what
one writer 28 has called the Achilles heel of the core-penumbra thesis.
"A 'penumbral' question is presented to the courts applying the 'hard
core and penumbra' thesis every time the court has to decide whether
a given case of uncertainty as to what to do in assigning meaning to
a statutory term is to be classified as one for its 'interpretation' function
or one for its 'legislative' function."29
How does one decide whether social aims are important or irrelevant?
If the difference between core and penumbra is a difference in degree,
why are not social aims always to some degree relevant? Finally, Hart
did not attempt to answer perhaps the most important question: how
is the judge to choose between competing interests?
THE PESSIMISM OF REALISM
The destructive criticism of the American Legal Realists has done
much to force a reappraisal of the function of the judge. It has exposed
in minute detail many "freaks of judicial lawmaking", 30 the errors
of formalism and mechanical jurisprudence. It has emphasized the
areas of freedom of action open to the judge where he must make a
deliberate choice. Realism has proved invaluable as an analytical tool
but "[a]nalysis is useless if it destroys what it is intended to ex-
plain."
31
23 HART, CONCEPT o LAW, 125.
24 Supra, note 22 at 200.
25 Supra, note 23 at 125.
26 Supra, note 22 at 202.
27 Supra, note 23 at 126.
28 Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine ,Statutory Mean-
ing: "The Low Road", (1960) 38 TEXAS L. REv. 392, 572.
29 Id. at 589.
30 POUND, COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION (1908), 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 at
405. 31 CARDOZ0, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921), 127.
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In its extreme form Realism is a sterile doctrine. It denies that
there are any objective standards which can guide the courts in
assigning meaning to a statute. "There are no such things as rules
or principles: there are only isolated dooms". 32 Radin, for example,
not only dismisses the concept of legislative intent, but he rejects
the idea that the purpose or object of a statute can provide any
guidance for the judge in his interpretive function. Because every
end is a means to some other end the immediate purpose of a statute
will depend largely on its remoter purpose. Thus Radin argues that
the judge can only ". . . select one of a concatenated sequence of pur-
poses"33 and ". . . he is impelled to make his selection . . . by those
psychical elements which make him the kind of person he is."
34
"What is desirable will be what is just, what is proper, what satisfies
the social emotions of the judge, what fits into the ideal scheme of society
which he entertains."
35
He neither can nor should look for normative standards other than
his own biases or his opinion of current community mores.
RENAISSANCE OF AN OLD IDEA
Somewhere between the extremes of literalism and realism there
is a theoretical approach to the problem of statutory interpretation
which could lead to a better understanding of the judicial process, and
a more satisfactory judicial technique. The primary requirement of
this approach is a return to the search for the legislative purpose
of a statute. It is no credit to English jurisprudence that a draft
formulation of this approach has existed for almost four centuries.
It was in 1584, that Sir Roger Manwood, C.B. and the other Barons
of the Exchequer met to decide Heydon's Case.36 Their opinion is
worth repeating:
"For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they
penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four
things are to be discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to
cure the disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all
the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy..."
This statement of principle might have provided a foundation on
which to build a theory, but about two hundred years ago the courts
reached what Plucknett described as ". . . the curious conclusion that
a statute can only be construed in the light of strictly professional
learning."37 They would consider what the law was before the statute,
32 Id. at 126.
33 Radin, supra, note 5 at 878.
34 Id. at 881.
35 Id. at 884.
36 (1584), 30 co.7a, 76 E.R. 637.
37 Id. T. PLUcKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (1956), 335.
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the "mischief" the statute was meant to remedy in view of what it
actually said, but they refused to look to Parliamentary debates for
guidance as to what was meant to be achieved by the language used,
nor to the Parliamentary history of a bill.38 It is true that every word
stated in the legislature should not become part of the law, and that
an excessive reliance on aids to the discovery of purpose which are
not readily available to the layman might be a hardship to those who
have to regulate their conduct by reference to statutory words. The
existence of these dangers, however, does not justify the conclusion
that the real aims and objectives of those who created a rule are
irrelevant when that rule is being applied. One respected legal scholar
laments: 39
"Much of our case-law certainly suggests that the letter killeth more
often than the spirit giveth life. We have a most elaborate code, slowly
and painfully built up for literal interpretation, and there is not a comma
or a hyphen which has not its solemn precedent .... There is much
reason for thinking that if the same amount of attention had been paid
to the more difficult and elusive principles of Heydon's Case-if, in short,
our statutory interpretation had not so weakly followed the line of least
resistance- many existing anomalies in our law might have been
avoided."
If the court will not consider the evidence which was before Parlia-
ment, or the general trend of debate, it can only speculate as to the
object or purpose of an Act. The dogma that all law must come from
the four corners of a statute cloaks a failure to look for what is
difficult to find.
PURPOSIVE REALISM
In recent years many legal thinkers have pleaded for the recog-
nition of the fundamental importance of legislative purpose in inter-
pretation. Professor Lon Fuller is one of the most persuasive. His
view of the function of the judge is coloured by his idea of law as
the "... enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance
of rules. ' '4° Unlike Hart and the positivists, who focus upon the rules
and the legaL system as a body of rules, Fuller "... treats laws as an
activity and regards a legal system as the product of a sustained
purposive effect. '41 From this it follows that courts and legislature
have co-operative roles to play in the task of striving for excellence
in legality, in ensuring the success of the purposive activity which
is law.
Having adopted purpose as the key to intelligent interpretation
Fuller must define, and suggest a method for finding it. Here he
resorts to metaphor.42 He compares the task of a judge to that of
the man whose father dies leaving him a sketch of an invention, the
development of which is incomplete. The son, instructed to finish the
work his father had begun, must first decide what need the projected
38 Id. at 335.
39 ALLEN, supra, note 14 at 507.
40 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964), 106.
41 Id. at 106.
42 Id. at 85.
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device was designed to fill. He must discover its purpose. He would
then attempt to find the principles on which its construction was
based, and to complete it in the light of this knowledge. It is this
process of thought which should be adopted by the judge in fashion-
ing rules out of statutory language. "The time for praise or blame
would come when we could survey what he had accomplished in this
inescapably creative role."43 Merit would depend on whether the
remedy provided by the statute, as applied in the particular case,
was an apt solution to the problem.
As Fuller himself concedes," this analogy is deceptively simple.
There may be a number of possible "mischiefs" which could have
prompted the passing of a statute. There may be a chain or sequence
of purposes only one of which can be chosen by the judge. At which
link should he stop?
One example of the difficulty of divining purpose has often been
quoted. In 1910 the Mann Act went into effect in the United States.
Cited as the White Slave Traffic Act, it provided that the transporta-
tion of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauch-
ery, or for any other immoral purpose . . ." across state boundaries
would be a felony. It was passed in response to a general belief
that there were organized groups in the States which preyed on
virtuous young girls, luring or coercing them into lives of prostitu-
tion, and then subjecting them to such brutal treatment that they
remained held in a state of near slavery. Although the reports of a
number of investigations had been published, the debate in Congress
showed no common understanding of the facts. In the light of history
the evils of white slavery seem to have been grossly exaggerated.
There was, however, a vague consensus that the bill was aimed at
trade or commerce in captive women who were the victims of a
criminal organization. It was not expected to interfere with state
powers to control local prostitution or immorality.
Within a very few years the Supreme Court had put its own
interpretation on the broad and ambiguous words of the Mann Act.
In 1915, it held that a woman could be convicted of conspiracy to
violate it, by agreeing to be transported for purposes of prostitution.
The White Slave Traffic Act was successfully employed as a basis for
the prosecution of a member of the class it was passed to protect.
Two years later, in the Caminetti cases, the Court denied the neces-
sity of any organized traffic and applied the words "for any other
immoral purpose" to the transportation of professional prostitutes,
not only by procurers, but by their customers. This sanctioned the
prosecution, under the Act, of anyone who took a woman, even with
her consent, across state lines for purposes of sexual immorality. In
1946, the Court upheld the conviction of a Mormon who, believing in
and practicing polygamy, crossed a state border with his wives.45
43 Id. at 87.
44 Id. at 87.
45 Case names and citations have been omitted; they can be found in
E. LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REAS0oNNG (1948), pp. 33-57; and HART &
SACKS, supra, note 6, pp. 1269-1274.
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Professor Levi used this account of the history of the Mann Act
in An Introduction to Legal Reasoning to show how statutory words
receive a fixed area of meaning once they have been interpreted. He
argues that after a decisive interpretation has determined the general
direction of an act, the court must not return to the original lan-
guage, and by reinterpreting legislative intent, attempt to escape the
consequences of caselaw. If the courts adopted a policy of revising
their interpretation of statutes at frequent intervals there would be
little incentive for the legislature ever to act.46 The primary law
making responsibility rests with the legislative branch of govern-
ment, he states, and the courts should operate so that it will be
encouraged to carry out its task effectively.4 7
Henry M. Hart and Albert Sacks suggest, using the Mann Act
to illustrate their point, that the legislative history and background
of a bill can be an aid to the discovery of its purpose, even though
preconceptions as to the use to be made of this material might affect
the conclusions drawn from it. Clearly, neither the draftsman nor
Congress as a whole intended to deal with all interstate forms of
sexual immorality between men and women. On the other hand, it
is doubtful whether the legislative history shows convincingly that
the purpose of the bill was to deal only with commercialized vice and
not with non-pecuniary immoralities.48 They argue that the doubt
engendered by the title, White Slave Traffic, in the light of the
history of the bill, should have precluded the Court from giving a
broad interpretation to a penal statute, as it did in the Caminetti
cases.49 Furthermore, the ". . . prevailing policy against incautious
or casual extensions of federal power into spheres occupied by the
states"50 should have raised a presumption against such a construc-
tion which the legislative history definitely fails to overcome.51
These two lessons drawn from the same set of facts illustrate the
complexity of the relationship between the purpose of the statute
and intent of the legislature. This may be what Llewellyn had in
mind when he described statutory purpose, in the sense of policy, as
being of two kinds each limited to some extent by the measures
chosen and the language used.
"On the one hand there are the ideas consciously before the draftsmen,
the committee, the legislature: a known evil to be cured, a known goal
to be attained, a deliberate choice of one line of approach rather than
another. Here talk of intent is reasonably realistic; committee reports,
legislative debate, historical knowledge of contemporary thinking or
campaigning which points up the evil or the goal can have significance." 52
46 LEvI, supra, note 45 at 32.
47 Id. at 57.
48 HART & SACKS, supra, note 6 at 1272.
49 Id. at 1272.
50 Id. at 1271.
51 Id. at 1272.
52 Llewellyn, supra, note 9 at 400.
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In this sense there is a connection between legislative purpose and
the intent of the legislator.
"But on the other hand-and increasingly as a statute gains in age-its
language is called upon to deal with circumstances utterly uncontem-
plated at the time of its passage. Here the quest is not properly for the
sense originally intended by the statute, for the sense sought originally
to be put into it, but rather for the sense which can be quarriedl out of it
in the light of the new situation' 53
In the first few years after the Mann Act was passed there would
have been considerable merit in looking to the mechanics of the
legislative process to find the evil to be cured, the choice of measures
adopted and the anticipated -effect of the statute. But after the
Supreme Court had construed the Act its purpose could not have been
found in the legislative history. Twenty or thirty years after Congress
argued the bill there would have been no point in asking what Mr.
Mann or the House intended to achieve by it, especially when their
view of the "mischief" to be remedied was based on such uncertain
and inaccurate information. The question then would be: what is
the purpose which the Supreme Court, exercising its legislative func-
tion, has attributed to the Act.
If one accepts the concept of law as the purposive enterprise
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules, then the
quality of a technique of statutory interpretation will be measured
by the success which courts using it achieve in this task. Hart and
Sacks have formulated an approach which might increase the likeli-
hood of achieving excellence in judicial process. They propose a two
step procedure.
The court's first job is to "decide what purpose ought to be
attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision of it which
may be involved . . ."54 Occasionally, this may be stated in the act
or a preamble, but otherwise it must be inferred, and this requires
that the court make an effort to imagine the position of the legisla-
ture which created the act. In this the judge must make two assump-
tions. He must assume that the legislature ". . . was made up of
reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."55 In addi-
tion, whether or not he agrees personally with the reasonableness
of the policies promoted in the statute, he must recognize that the
legislators ". . . were trying responsibly and in good faith to dis-
charge their constitutional powers and duties. '56 The judge should
then use the principles of Heydon's Case, comparison of old and new
law, to find the "mischief" and the "true reason of the remedy." In
this task prior development of the law, public knowledge, commission
reports and legislative history may all be relevant.57 The purpose
which should be attributed to the statute may also depend on the
53 Id. at 400.
54 HART & SAcKs, supra, note 6 at 1411.
55 Id. at 1415.
56 Id. at 1415.
57 Id. at 1415.
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way it has been interpreted in previous cases, where the courts in
the exercise of their power to create law may have defined the
purpose of an act.
Once it has decided the matter of purpose, the court must
"interpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as
to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that
it does not give the words either- (a) a meaning they will not bear,
or (b) a meaning which would violate any established policy of clear
statement."5
The language of a statute limits the action a court can take.
Dictionaries, and the traditional grammatical rules and maxims of
construction may be used to show the possible range of meanings
open to the court. But the legislative process cannot operate if the
integrity of language is subverted by deliberate misuse of words.59
The policies of clear statement which should restrict the court
in its choice of meaning for a particular statute have their origin
in the principle that it is of vital importance that men can know
in general terms the conduct which the law demands of them. The
language of the law must have sufficient clarity to make this pos-
sible, especially when the boundaries of criminal conduct are defined,
or where the implementation of legislative purpose would demand a
departure from traditional legal policy. 60
HOPE FOR THE BETTER WAY
The method of judicial reasoning outlined here would demand
far more of the judge than is conventional. He must have a thorough
understanding of the role which he is to play in the lawmaking
process if he is to act creatively and yet abide by democratic prin-
ciples. For this reason he should approach the task of interpretation
with a clear idea of the limits of his own power and the power of
the legislature. He must concede the supremacy of the legislative
branch of government in the policy making area. The court is not
equipped to carry out large scale investigations, to determine the
worth of many competing interests and assign priorities to various
policies. Responsibility here must be taken by the legislature and
issues decided in the political arena. But the fact that some questions
must be left to the legislature does not mean that only that body
can create or change law.
"While on the one hand maintaining the historic common law position
that a legislative command is to be construed literally so as to interfere
as little as possible with the status quo, the courts have with the other
hand elevated a concept that only the legislature has lawmaking power
into a formidable barrier to improvement and adaptation of law through
the judicial process." 61
58 Id. at 1411.
59 Id. at 1412.
60 Id. at 1413.
61 Read, The Judicial Process in Common Law Canada (1959), 37 CAw. B.
Ryv. 265 at 276.
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Those who create statutes must frame general propositions in lan-
guage. Their power is limited by its nature. They cannot anticipate
in detail every effect of their work; nor can they resolve in advance
all the possible conflicts which may arise out of the choice of a
particular remedy for an immediate problem. It is the responsibility
of the courts to create law and resolve conflicts in the light of the
general approach taken by the legislature-to co-operate in the effort
to achieve excellence in legality. In this co-operation is the only hope
for a process which will encourage decisions in the "Grand Style":
"'Precedent' guided, but 'principle' controlled; and nothing [is] good
'Principle' which [does] not look like wisdom-in-result for the welfare of
AII-of-us."62
TUPPER v. THE QUEEN
Almost any decision of the Supreme Court of Canada could be
analysed with profit in the light of the theoretical conclusions ad-
vanced here. Writing of the situation in the United States, Professor
Witherspoon states:
"It is becoming increasingly rare today for an American court to 'whistle
up its courage' with a forthright statement that the meaning it assigns
a statute is 'what the statute says' or is the 'manifestly plain meaning
of the statute' while at the same time omitting any reference to the
complex thought process by which the conclusion was reached." 63
There is no lack of whistling in Canadian courts. The two opinions
in Tupper6 4 comprise a total of four pages of type in the Dominion
Law Reports. This is the Canadian style. It is worth comparing the
approach taken by the Court with that which might have been taken
by a different court with a different heritage.
The appellant was charged under s. 295 (1) of the Criminal Code
which reads:
"Every one who without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies upon him,
has in his possession any instrument for house-breaking, vault-breaking
or safe-breaking is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprison-
ment for fourteen years."
He had been a passenger in the front seat of a car which was stopped
by the police in downtown Hamilton at ten minutes to two in the
morning of October 5, 1965. In the car the police had found: a
screwdriver in the rear seat; a Phillips screwdriver on the passenger
side of the front seat; a flashlight, a pair of socks and a pair of nylons
in the glove box; a seventeen inch gooseneck crowbar, a pair of gloves
and a small screwdriver under the front seat on the driver's side.
About two weeks earlier the accused had been in the car when it
had been stopped and searched. The same articles, with the exception
of the crowbar, were in it then, but no charges were laid. The car
did not belong to either Tupper or the driver. It had been rented by
62 Llewellyn, supra, note 9 at 396.
63 Witherspoon, "The Low Road", supra, note 28 at 426.
64 (1967), 63 D.L.R. 2d 289.
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a third person for one day on September 23, and had been retained
beyond the term of the lease.
Tupper was convicted at trial. The conviction was affirmed and
sentence increased by the Ontario Court of Appeal. He then appealed
to the Supreme Court of Canada on two questions of law: (1)
whether there was any evidence of possession before the magistrate,
and (2) whether it is necessary for the crown to adduce evidence of
suspicious circumstances when the instruments are "capable of and
normally used for ordinary purposes, but may also be used for house-
breaking", 65 before the accused must prove his possession of them
was lawful.
The first question was succinctly answered in the affirmative.
Judson, J., pointed out that one of the screwdrivers was on the seat
on which Tupper was sitting, took judicial notice of the fact that
"[s]crewdrivers are not left haphazardly on the seats of cars",
66
and disposed of the first ground of appeal.
Nor did the second question present any great difficulty to the
court.67 After stating that leave had been granted because of the
disparity between decisions in various provinces, Judson, J., proceeded,
in about two hundred words, to settle the law.
The defence relied on a number of cases 68 to the effect that
where the instruments in question would normally serve a lawful
purpose, the crown must adduce some evidence from which an infer-
ence might be drawn that they were intended to be used for an
unlawful purpose, before the burden of proving a lawful excuse fell
upon the accused. Judson, J. disagreed:
"... . this statement of the law is erroneous and ignores the plain wording
of the section. The English version reads: 'any instrument for house-
breaking'; the French version reads: 'un instrument pouvant servir aux
effractions de maisons'. The French version makes the meaning clear.
Both versions mean the same thing. An instrument for house-breaking
is one capable of being used for house-breaking."69
"Once possession of an instrument capable of being used for house-
breaking has been shown, the burden shifts to the accused to show on
a balance of probabilities that there was lawful excuse for possession
of the instrument at the time and place in question." 70
Hall, J. reluctantly found himself compelled by the wording of
the section, to agree with the law as pronounced by Judson, J.:
"Whether Parliament intended it or not s. 295 (1), as it reads, permits
of no other interpretation."7 He goes on, however, to draw to
65 Id. at 290.
66 Id. at 291.
67 Fauteux, Martland and Ritchie JJ. concurred with Judson J.; Hall J.
concurred in a separate opinion.
68 Smith (1967) 119 C.C.C. 397; Haire (1958) 122 C.C.C. 205; McRae (1967)
59 W.W.R. 36.
69 Supra, note 64 at 292.
70 Id. at 292.
71 Id. at 292.
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Parliament's attention the fact that this would require that anyone
in the possession of a variety of common tools in the most innocent
circumstances could be
"... brought into Court and put to the proof that he has a lawful excuse
fr having a screwdriver, a flashlight or some other such household tool
or instrument in his car, boat, tool kit or on his person at any given time
or place which includes his home."72
Surely that one great sun of a principle, the plain meaning rule,
7 3
has dictated a conclusion which is anything but "wisdom-in-result for
the welfare of All-of-us. '7 4 The words of s. 295 (1) now have a plain
meaning; did they before the Supreme Court so held?
In the first place one might wonder how language which was
clear and unambiguous could have been interpreted by so many
different courts in different ways. But this question apart, there is
at least one "rule" of interpretation which suggests that there might
have been a shadow of ambiguity here.
"In dealing with matters related to the general public, statutes are pre-
sumed to use words in their popular sense; uti Zoquitur vu7gus."75
Would an instrument for housebreaking in the popular sense, be any
thing capable of being used for breaking into a house?
If the man next door were to meet a nurse in a hospital corridor
carrying a tray on which there are scalpels, sutures, clamps, scissors,
forceps, thread and rubber gloves, he would have little trouble in
identifying these objects as surgical instruments. Some of them were
designed specifically for the purpose of operating on the human body.
Others acquire their character from their situation. If the tray con-
tained only the gloves and a pair of scissors, the man next door
might have some difficulty in classifying these items, but he would
no longer be perplexed when he saw the nurse enter the operating
theatre. Now he could state with some certainty that these were
instruments for surgery. But if he then went home, pointed to the
rubber gloves and the kitchen scissors on the counter beside the sink,
and asked his wife for the surgical instruments, would she under-
stand him?
Again, if the man next door were asked for a tool for naildriving,
would he understand this as a request for a hammer, or a shoe?
Yet when he finds a large nail protruding from the bench on which
he sits in the ball park, he may well use the heel of his shoe to drive
it in. It is submitted that as language is commonly used, a hammer
is a tool for driving nails and a screwdriver for placing screws. They
are plainly housebreaking instruments only because the Court did
not use language in the ordinary way. Thus words become terms
of art.
72 Id. at 293.
73 Willis, supra, note 2 at 2.
74 Llewellyn, supra, note 9 at 396.
75 Wimsox & GALPiN, supra, note 4 at 53.
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In the majority judgment, much was made of the fact that the
French version of the section can be translated, "an instrument able
to serve for the breaking of houses." For Judson, J., this settled the
matter, making the English meaning clear. The process of reasoning
is deceptively simple. The rule that both English and French versions
of a Canadian statute are official, and therefore either can be used
to interpret the other, does not have much to recommend it. Because
Parliament speaks with this forked tongue, everyone must be pre-
sumed to know the law in two languages, an empty presumption in
the light of the fact that the vast majority of Canadians are fluent
in only one. The criminal law, in particular, should not be an arcane
science. Be that as it may, this rule, like all the others, requires
a choice.
The simple statement, "both versions mean the same thing", can
only be made when both versions have been interpreted, and a
decision made to apply the rule. If the French had been ". .. ne pas
pouvant servir aux effractions . . ." the Court would not have hesi-
tated to point out that there had been an obvious oversight, and
the versions could not possibly mean the same thing. The method can
be illustrated by another recent Supreme Court decision.
In JKlippert76 the defence suggested that the French version of
s. 659(b) of the Criminal Code should be considered as governing.
The question before the Court involved the definition of a "dangerous
sexual offender": in English, "a person who by his conduct in any
sexual matter, has shown a failure to control his sexual impulses
.. "; in French, one ".... qui d'apr~s sa conduite a mati~re sexuelle,
a manifest6 une impuissance A maitriser ses impulsions sexuelles..."
Defence counsel argued that the French version indicated that the
meaning of the section was similar to that of the English version
before it was amended in 1961, and that a dangerous sexual offender
was someone who had shown a lack of power to control his sexual
impulses rather than one who had merely failed to control them.
77
Fauteux, J. compared the words of the present French version
with those before the amendment, and found them substantially
identical. He therefore decided that this was not a situation where
the English or French text was capable of assisting the other in a
matter of interpretation, but one where it was necessary to elect
between versions. With good reason, he chose to follow the version
which reflected the change in the law made by the amendment.
78
The purpose of this account has nothing to do with the merit
of the choice made by Fauteux, J. It is merely to show that both
versions are not always construed as the "intent of Parliament".
In K!Zippert the Court found a reason for entirely disregarding the
French words. In Tupper, on the other hand, the question was deter-
76 (1968), 65 D.L.R. 2d 698.
77 Id. at 708.
78 Id. at 709.
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mined by the simple expedient of applying the rule, and the plain
meaning in French became the plain meaning in English. In both
cases the Court had a choice. First as to whether it would consider
the two official versions as authoritative, so they could assist each
other, and secondly, as to which of the two would do the assisting.
If the Court had viewed the law as a purposive activity and had
adopted an approach approximating that suggested earlier in this
paper, it might not have interpreted s. 295(1) in a manner which
Hall, J. found alarming.
As a first step it would have tried to find the purpose of the
section. The crime of possession of housebreaking tools was created
by the English judiciary. One of the original definitions was provided
in 1852, in R. v. 07dham,79 where it was stated that an "implement
of housebreaking" was any one that could be used for that purpose
".... if the jury find it to have been in the possession of the person
charged for that purpose at the time and place alleged .. ." With
this definition in mind, the Commissioners incorporated this offence
in the English Draft Code, with the thought that such possession
was prima facie evidence of a criminal intent.8 0 The Canadian Criminal
Code of 1892, based on the Draft Code, included the crime of posses-
sion of housebreaking instruments in what was s. 464, before the
revision of 1953-4. This provided that everyone found having posses-
sion by night, without lawful excuse the burden of proof of which
lay upon him, of any instrument of housebreaking, or, having posses-
sion by day with intent to commit an indictable offence, was guilty
of an indictable offence. Under this section it was essential that the
person be discovered; mere possession without being found had been
held not to be sufficient. There was also a heavy burden on the Crown
to prove an intent if possession was by day. This was the state of the
law at the time the present s. 295 (1) was enacted.8'
The "mischief" against which the law, as developed so far, was
directed, was clearly the crime of burglary. The "reason of the
remedy" is also relatively clear. Because it is difficult to control
this crime if one must wait till a house is broken into, find the
culprit and prove his guilt, the law provides other ways to act
against those who intend to commit burglary, as evidenced by some
action in furtherance of that end. The crimes of conspiracy, attempt
and possession of instruments all provide a substitute for the act of
housebreaking. In this case the legislature decided that if a person
were found at night with certain kinds of tools, that, by itself, would
raise a presumption that he intended to use them to commit burglary.
When the Code was revised, the word "found" was dropped, and
the mere possession, without being able to prove lawful excuse, of
79 (1852) 5 Cox C.C. 379.
80 J. MALTnAR THn CRmNmI. CODE (1955), 518.
81 Popple, Found in Possession of Housebreaking or Safebreaking Instru-
ments (1950), 10 C.R. 408 (Annotation).
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any instrument for housebreaking, at any time, became an offence.
By comparing this with the prior law it is evident that one purpose
of the revision was to allow the conviction when instruments were
found in someone's room or home, and to eliminate the difficult pro-
cess of proving intent where the possession was not at night. Beyond
this it is difficult to infer.
The debates in Parliament on the revision of the Criminal Code
are not a great deal of help. The Minister of Justice, Mr. Garson,
stated that the "... possession of housebreaking tools was considered
to bring the accused into the category of a burglar. .,",82 and he
clearly intended that the onus should be on anyone possessing such
instruments at any time, to show a lawful excuse.83 This caused Mr.
Fulton some concern. He pointed out that it might ". . . go hard
with the genuine artisan who always carries his tools by day...,,,84
but he agreed to the clause because he understood it had been
thoroughly discussed in committee. Nobody at that time considered
the meaning of the words "instrument for housebreaking", or suggest-
ed that any thing capable of being used for housebreaking, without
more, would fit the definition. If it was the intention of Parliament to
require everyone at any time to be able to prove he had lawful
excuse for the possession of a screwdriver, that intention was not
articulated.
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the purpose of s. 295 (1),
as it operates in the framework of the present Criminal Code, is
essentially the same as that of the section it replaced. It provides
that the possession of housebreaking instruments, without excuse,
is an offence, because that is sufficient reason to infer that the instru-
ments have been, or will be used to commit a burglary.
Having attributed a purpose to the section the Court should then
interpret the words to carry out that purpose, bearing in mind that
any drastic change in the law should be clearly stated. The construc-
tion which the Supreme Court put upon the words in this case, quite
obviously results in a departure from the traditional principles of
the criminal law. It is somewhat startling to find that everyone who
has a hammer may be guilty of an indictable offence if he cannot
prove on a balance of probabilities, that he has a lawful excuse for
having it; the whole doctrine of "reasonable doubt" has been pushed
aside.
It would have been possible to effect the legislative purpose of
s. 295 (1) without any such extreme interpretation. The example used
earlier, of the man next door and his problems with the surgical
instruments, helps to indicate the solution. The words "instrument
for house-breaking", as used by Parliament, cannot be defined in
the abstract. A few items, such as skeleton keys or lock-picks, are
82 House of Commons Debates 1953-54, Vol. III, P. 2489.
83 Id. at 2489.
84 Id. at 2490.
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used solely for breaking into houses, but other tools become house-
breaking instruments only by inference. They are not merely capable
for use for this purpose, but have a character which arises from the
surrounding circumstances. The fact that the section was designed to
remove the necessity of proving a specific intent to commit burglary,
does not mean that the words "instrument for house-breaking" must
be defined in a special way. If the Court had adopted a purposive
approach, it might have realized that it had a duty to create rational
law out of the words of the Criminal Code. It might then have con-
cluded that instruments for housebreaking are those which are cap-
able of use for that purpose, and which by reason of the circum-
stances surrounding their possession, can be inferred to be intended
for use in the commission of housebreaking or to have been used for
housebreaking. Hall, J. might not then have been so unhappy with
the decision.
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